We study how financial market participants process news from four major central banks-the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Federal Reserve (Fed)-using a novel survey of 195 financial market participants from around the world. Our results indicate that, first, respondents rely more on media reports of central bank events than they do on self-monitoring. The only exceptions are interest rate decisions in the respondent's home region. In general, the Fed is watched most closely, followed by the ECB, the BoJ, and the BoE. Second, ordered probit estimations reveal that the perceived reliability of media coverage is negatively associated with degree of self-monitoring and positively related to the probability of using media reports, particularly in the case of asset managers. The perceived importance of central bank events is positively related to the degree of self-monitoring in the case of traders. Finally, portfolio managers tend to self-monitor their home central bank more often than do respondents from other parts of the world.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the 'art' of central bank watching has changed substantially.
For instance, prior to February 1994, market participants had to infer from open market operations whether and, if so, to what extent, the Federal Reserve's (Fed) policy stance had changed (Poole, 2005) . From the mid-1990s, however, and right up until the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, central banks increasingly used communication for explaining past interest rate decisions and preparing market participants for upcoming decisions. 1 In recent years, with interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound, some central banks (e.g., the Fed and the Bank of Canada) have gone one step further.
They have introduced 'conditional commitments' to keep the interest rate at this ultralow level, where the conditionality is based on the development of specific macroeconomic variables.
Given the flood of daily information to which financial agents are exposed, it is unlikely that they are able to directly monitor all action by and communication from the many central banks, not to mention the vast number of worldwide macroeconomic news and company-specific announcements. Financial agents are time constrained and, to a greater or lesser extent, must rely on the media, particularly newswire services, to digest this flood of information. 2 Indeed, Neuenkirch (2014) shows that financial market news is not necessarily created at the time the information becomes available, but comes into existence only after it undergoes a filtering process by Reuters. 3 However, there are at least two risks of relying on media reporting. First, media agencies might be selective in their coverage, thereby ignoring certain events they consider non-newsworthy. Indeed, Neuenkirch (2014) finds that Reuters disregards the majority of speeches by the lesser-known Fed presidents. There is even some evidence that the media attempts to 'sell' news to financial markets, as the probability of media coverage is higher if there has not been any communication for a while or it occurs right before the weekend. In addition, Berger et al. (2013) show that extreme views about the ECB receive more coverage and that especially negative views are reported more extensively. Finally, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) conclude that newswire reports of 1 There is a growing body of literature investigating the effects of central bank communication. For a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, see Blinder et al. (2008) . 2 In a seminal paper, Sims (2003) provides a theoretical framework for information-processing constraints in macroeconomic models. 3 See also Hendry (2012) . first paper to take a closer look at how financial agents process central bank news. 4 Typically, the usefulness of central bank action and, in particular, central bank communication is evaluated by (i) its impact on financial markets (see the extensive survey by Blinder et al., 2008) , (ii) its value in predicting future interest rate decisions (Jansen and de Haan, 2009; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010; Sturm and de Haan, 2011), or (iii) its role in the monetary policy transmission process (Neuenkirch, 2013) . Figure 1 summarises this standard view. This stylised standard view is an oversimplification, as the effect of central bank action and communication on economic outcomes is undoubtedly complex (see also Woodford, 2005) . Central bankers' crucial task is to influence the expectations of economic agents, which in turn will lead to changes in the economic outcome. Therefore, we believe that Figure 2 more realistically describes the actual transmission process. process. In addition, it is important to know the extent to which the media serve as news transmitters in the sense that they select central bank events that are-in their viewnewsworthy and provide financial agents with an interpretation of these events. Both issues, the perception by financial markets and the role of the media, are neglected in the literature. Thus, by studying how economic agents monitor central bank news, this paper highlights some novel aspects of how interest rate decisions and communication affect economic outcomes.
A related strand of literature explores the role of the media in transmitting central bank communication to the general public (de Haan et al., 2004; Reid and du Plessis, 2011; Lamla and Sturm, 2013) . The tone of media communications about central banks is assessed in Berger et al. (2011) and Böhm et al. (2012) . Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) study how explanations of monetary policy decisions at press conferences are perceived by financial markets. Our paper also contributes to that branch of the finance literature that uses surveys of financial market participants to achieve insight into, for example, information acquisition and trading behaviour (see, e.g., Shiller and Pound, 1989; Menkhoff, 1998; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Oberlechner and Hocking, 2004; Menkhoff and Nikiforow, 2009 ). However, none of these papers studies the media's role in shaping perceptions of financial market participants in regard to central bank communication and action.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the survey and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results of the survey. Section 5 concludes.
The Survey
The survey was conducted by Barclays Europe between 17 April and 1 May 2013. 5 All subscribers to Barclay's fixed income newsletter were invited via e-mail to participate in an online survey. A diverse set of 844 Barclays clients working in execution, trading, portfolio management, liability management, financial analysis, economic analysis, or in the press department started the survey. However, to ensure that we capture only financial market actors, we focus on those 360 respondents who are 'direct' financial market participants working in execution/trading or 'indirect' market participants working in asset allocation or portfolio/liability management. 6 Regrettably, a notable number of participants did not fully complete the questionnaire, and thus our final sample consists of 195 financial market actors who responded to at least one question relevant for our analysis with an answer other than 'no opinion/no answer'. 7 Our sample consists of 24 asset allocators, 70 traders, and 101 portfolio managers-from all over the world. 8 A general analysis of the recent round of survey data, targeted to Barclays' clients, can be found in Barclays (2013) .
In the following subsections, we introduce the survey questions relevant for this paper and discuss some descriptive results. Respondents were asked to answer the questions separately for four central banks: the BoE, the BoJ, the ECB, and the Fed. After completing the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to comment on the general theme of the survey, that is, central bank communication. We occasionally refer to these comments, as they contribute some depth to the answers to the structured questions; in a sense, taking the comments into consideration combines our quantitative analysis with some aspects of a qualitative analysis.
Monitoring Central Bank Events
Our analysis starts with the question of how market participants monitor interest rate decisions and speeches. Q1a: How do you monitor the interest rate decisions by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed? I read the press releases or watch the press conferences.
Q1b: How do you monitor the interest rate decisions by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed? I rely on media reporting. Q1c: How do you monitor speeches by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed officials? I read the transcript/manuscript or watch/listen to the speech. 6 Thus, we exclude any respondent who works as an analyst/economist or in the press/media department, as well as all participants who did not specify their position. 7 Seventy of these 360 respondents did not answer a single question other than those asking about their position and location. Participants always had the option of answering 'no opinion/no answer' or of skipping a question. 8 Africa and Middle East: 10 respondents (5% of total respondents); Australasia/Asia (excluding Japan): 19 (10%); Europe (excluding the UK): 44 (23%); Japan 33 (17%); North America: 43 (22%); South America: 4 (2%); United Kingdom: 42 (22%).
Q1d: How do you monitor speeches by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed officials? I rely on media reporting. Survey participants were asked to answer the four questions separately on a four-point scale (1 = never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = always). This setup allows capturing a situation where financial market actors self-monitor central bank actions and communications and, at the same time, rely on media reporting. Table 1 summarises the mean answers for the four questions across central banks. Kruskal-Wallis (1952 , 1953 tests for differences in the medians across both groups. Test statistics in bold are significant at the 5% level.
Comparing attention level across central banks, the same pattern is seen for both self-monitoring of interest rate decisions (rows (1)) and using media reports to monitor speeches (rows (4)). The Fed is monitored most closely, followed by the ECB. The BoE and the BoJ jointly rank third. 9 In the case of self-monitoring of speeches (rows (3)), the BoE ranks third behind the Fed and the ECB in the first and the second place, respectively, and the BoJ ranks fourth. 10 Finally, market participants rely on media reports for monitoring interest rate decisions (rows (2)) to the same degree for the BoJ, the ECB, and the Fed. Only the BoE's decisions are followed less often using media reports. 11 There is a significant home bias ('Diff. Sign.' column in When considering the full sample ('Total' column in Table 1 ), we find that market participants rely more on media reporting to learn about interest rate decisions (rows (2)) and speeches (rows (4)) than on self-monitoring (rows (1) and (3) Table   3 presents the results for the same exercise but with regard to central bankers'
speeches.
There is a tendency for financial market participants to use media reports and self-monitoring with the same intensity, as 40% of the observations are on the main diagonal in the case of the home central bank and interest rate decisions (left panel of Table 2 ). In addition, the modal category is 4 = always/4 = always in this case. The figures for interest rate decisions by non-home central banks (30%) as well as speeches by the home central bank (35%) and non-home central banks (38%) are a bit smaller but nevertheless confirm that a substantial share of respondents stay informed using both means with the same intensity. In these three cases, the modal category is 2 = occasionally self-monitoring central bank events and 3 = often using media reports to follow these. The cross-tabulation also confirms that self-monitoring is relatively more prominent in the case of interest rate decisions of the home central banks than for the other events. Notes: Coding: 1 = never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = always.
Importance of Central Bank Events
A second set of questions is concerned with the persistence of the market impact of interest rate decisions and speeches.
Q2a: In your opinion, how persistent is the impact of interest rate decisions by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed on financial markets?
Q2b: In your opinion, how persistent is the impact of speeches by BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed officials on financial markets? 17
The answer scale for these questions is: 5 = greater than one month, 4 = one month, 3 = one week, 2 = intra-day, and 1 = no persistence. We employ answers to these questions 17 Since monetary policy committees (MPC) typically have a certain hierarchy, we ask this question separately for (i) the governor and (ii) other MPC members for the BoE and BoJ. In the case of the ECB and Fed, we distinguish between three types of speakers: (i) the president/chairman, (ii) board members, and (iii) national/regional central bank presidents. To create an aggregate measure of persistence, we use the average across speaker groups in each central bank.
as proxies for the subjective importance of central bank action and communication in the eyes of financial market participants. If, for instance, the impact of a central bank event on financial markets is perceived to last for a week, then this event is more important for market actors than another one that only causes some intra-day movement. Table 4 summarises the mean answers to the two questions across the four central banks. Notes: Coding: 1 = no persistence, 2 = intra-day, 3 = one week, 4 = one month, 5 = greater than one month.
The 'Home' column shows means from respondents located in the home region of the respective central bank compared to those from the rest of the world ('Non-H.'). The 'Diff. Sign.' column shows Chi 2 -test statistics and p-values (in square brackets) of Kruskal-Wallis (1952 , 1953 tests for differences in the medians across both groups. Test statistics in bold are significant at the 5% level.
For all central banks, the impact of verbal communication is perceived to be much less persistent than the impact of interest rate decisions. 18 This is generally in line with empirical 'event' studies analysing the effect of announcements on financial markets (see, e.g., the survey by Neely and Dey, 2010) . We find that at least one-third of the participants perceive the interest rate decisions of all four major central banks to have an impact that persists for more than one month. This complements 'news' studies in the extant literature, in which, typically, high-frequency data are employed, that is, daily observations or higher. One methodological problem of these approaches is that, by construction, it is difficult to show that announcements have a longer-term, economically relevant impact. Our survey results suggest that participants believe that monetary policy actions have persistent effects and, thus, we contribute to the literature on the impact of 'news' on financial markets.
In addition, there is a distinct hierarchy in the persistence of the impact of interest rate decisions: the Fed ranks first, followed by the three other central banks. 19 In the case of speeches, we cannot statistically distinguish between the BoJ, the ECB, or the Fed, but it is clear that the BoE ranks last. 20 This ordering of the importance of central banks reflects the size of their respective economies.
The subjective assessment of the persistent impact of central bank events on financial markets exhibits a home bias, as survey participants from the UK evaluate the persistence of BoE events as longer compared to evaluations made by respondents from the rest of the world. Finally, we find evidence of a significant home bias in the case of the BoJ's interest rate decisions. 21
Reliability of Media Coverage
A third question evaluates the media's reliability regarding coverage of central bank events.
Q3: In general, how reliable do you think the media coverage is of actions and communications by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed?
The answer scale for this question is: 1 = unreliable, 2 = neither reliable nor unreliable, 3 = reliable, and 4 = very reliable. Table 5 summarises the mean answers across central banks.
In general, market participants are pleased with the media's coverage of central banks, as the mean answer is 'reliable' in all four cases. Media coverage of the Fed ranks first in terms of reliability, followed by the BoE. The BoJ and the ECB are jointly ranked last. 22 We find no evidence of a home bias at the 5% level of significance. 23 This question generated several informal comments from survey participants that enrich the impression about the media's reliability. Interestingly, the opinions are less favourable when compared to the answers given to the structured survey questions. Other respondents, however, defend the media, as they think the central banks themselves are responsible for creating diverging interpretations of the same event:
'Central Banks need to … reduce the jargon that only very few outside central banks understand and feel at ease with'. Another participant puts forward an interesting proposal: 'Central bank announcements are (naturally) divorced from comment and analysis of the same. Hence, some kind of synthesis would be a good idea, with accredited analysts and academics being able to post analysis, observations, and criticisms to the central bank websites. This would be a lot better than having to rely on the media for interpretation'.
Finally, we need to emphasise a caveat when it comes to interpreting answers to Q1b, Q1d, and, Q3. The term 'media' incorporates newswire services but also, for instance, newspapers and television. Consequently, respondents might have different types of media in mind when answering how often they rely on media reporting to monitor central bank events or when they assess the reliability of media coverage. In our analysis, we cannot control for these potentially different interpretations.
Empirical Methodology
Next, we employ a multivariate framework to relate the two different ways of We estimate separate models for the three different groups of financial market participants in our sample (asset allocation, execution/trading, and portfolio/liability manager) to discover whether there are differences across groups.
Since all participants were asked the same questions for each of the four central banks, we conduct our analysis in a quasi-panel setup. 24 There are three key advantages of this approach compared to estimating separate models for each central bank. indicates the presence of a home bias, we also include a vector of indicator variables to describe this phenomenon. The residuals , are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution and the ordered probit models are estimated by maximum likelihood. We employ standard errors clustered at the respondents' level (Rogers, 1993) , as our survey design does not ensure that the observations are identically distributed and the pooled setup leads to intra-group correlation in the standard errors of each respondent.
The estimated coefficients of ordered probit models are difficult to interpret, as they measure the influence of the explanatory variables on the latent variable , *
. 25 As part of our robustness tests, we estimated a version of Equation (1) Finally, a caveat is in order so as to avoid misinterpretation of our empirical analysis. One could make the case that agents who self-monitor central bank news justify doing so by asserting the importance of that event. Likewise, those who follow media reports, for whatever reason, would be loath to admit that these reports could be unreliable. Consequently, we cannot exclude the possibility that simultaneity exists between the left-hand-side variables and the explanatory variables. Inasmuch as the regressors are indeed endogenous, the estimated coefficients reflect correlations between the means of monitoring central bank events as well as (i) the perceived importance of these events and (ii) the perceived reliability of media reporting on these events rather than causal effects.
Empirical Results

Self-Monitoring
We first take a closer look at the correlates of self-monitoring of central bank action and communication. Tables 6 and 7 present results for interest rate decisions and speeches.
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix show the corresponding average marginal effects for the categories 1 = never and 4 = always. 26 The results indicate that the stated reasons for directly monitoring central bank events are roughly the same for both actions and communications. In contrast, we find that the three groups of financial market actors give very different reasons for selfmonitoring central banks. (Rogers, 1993) .
First, in the case of asset managers (left columns in Tables 6 and 7) , the decision to self-monitor central bank events is associated with the belief that the media is 'unreliable'. For interest rate decisions, this effect can be found for the BoE and Fed, whereas for speeches, we observe significant coefficients for the BoE and ECB. For instance, the conditional probability to 'never' self-monitor Fed interest rate decisions increases by about 12 percentage points (pp) after a one-unit increase in the reliability of media coverage about the Fed. We also observe a significant home bias in the case of interest rate decisions. Respondents from Europe are almost 27 pp more likely to 'always' self-monitor ECB actions than are those living in other parts of the world. For the Fed, we do not only observe a home bias, but also a positive central-bank-fixed effect. Compared to the reference central bank, the BoE, asset managers have a 43 pp greater likelihood of 'always' self-monitoring the Fed's interest rate decisions. In addition, the effect is even 34 pp larger for financial market participants from North America. (Rogers, 1993) .
Second, for the group of traders, we find that the probability of self-monitoring a 
Reliance on Media Reports
Next, we turn to the determinants of relying on media reports to monitor monetary policy action and communication. Tables 8 and 9 present results for interest rate decisions and speeches. Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix show the corresponding average marginal effects for the categories 1 = never and 4 = always.
In contrast to the previous findings, market persistence of central bank events does not play a significant role for any of the three groups of financial market actors.
Thus, the decision to monitor an event via media reports is not directly related to the event's perceived financial market impact. In addition, when it comes to using media Notes: Table shows coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of ordered probit models. Locationfixed effects are included but not reported. Chi 2 test statistics and p-values (in square brackets) of Wald joint exclusion tests are given in the top line of each variable group. Coefficients and test statistics in bold are significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are clustered at the respondents' level (Rogers, 1993) .
For traders, the media's perceived reliability is the only significant variable. A one-unit increase in this variable is associated with a 16 pp/27 pp/15 pp higher conditional likelihood of 'always' using media reports to monitor interest rate decisions by the BoE/BoJ/ECB. The corresponding average marginal effect is about 15 pp for 'always' using media reports in the case of speeches by BoJ officials.
Finally, our explanatory variables do not really explain why portfolio managers choose to use media reports as a means of monitoring central banks. The only significant variable in our estimations is a home bias for portfolio managers from the United Kingdom, who use media reports more often for monitoring the BoE's interest rate decisions than do their colleagues from other parts of the world: the probability that they 'always' employ media reports is roughly 13 pp higher. (Rogers, 1993) .
Thus, in general, perceived reliability of media coverage is a significant factor explaining reliance on it (except in the case of portfolio/liability managers). However, as mentioned in Section 2.3, some respondents raised serious concerns about the selectiveness of the media and its potential misinterpretation of events.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide an answer to the question of how financial market participants process news from four major central banks-the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to take a closer look at how financial agents digest central bank news.
We use a worldwide survey of financial market participants to study how financial agents monitor central bank actions and communications and to what extent the media works as a news transmitter.
In the first step of our investigation, we conduct an extensive descriptive analysis that reveals several items of interest. First, market participants rely more on media reporting to learn about central bank events than on self-monitoring. The only exception is interest rate decisions by the central bank in the respondent's home region. In addition, the general attention level-irrespective of whether events are self-monitored or followed via media reporting-is higher for interest rate decisions than for speeches.
Comparing financial market actors' attention level across central banks reveals a distinct hierarchy: the Fed is monitored most closely, followed by the ECB, the BoJ, and the BoE. Qualitative statements by some respondents indicate, however, that there are problems with respect to the perceived quality of media reporting.
In the second step, we estimate ordered probit models to study the relationship between self-monitoring central bank news or relying on media coverage with indicators measuring the perceived importance of events, reliability of media coverage, and home bias. We conduct a separate analysis for three groups of financial market participants. First, we find that for asset managers the reliability of media coverage is negatively associated with the degree of self-monitoring and positively related to the probability of using media reports to follow central bank events. Second, if traders perceive the financial market impact of actions and communications as particularly persistent, then the conditional likelihood of monitoring these events directly increases.
Similar to what we find for asset managers, perceived media reliability is positively related to traders' use of media reports to monitor central bank events. Finally, neither the reliability of media coverage nor the importance of central bank events is significantly related to the probability of central bank watching for portfolio managers.
For this group, we only observe significant home biases for some central banks, especially when self-monitoring interest rate decisions and speeches.
As the management of expectations is a key element of modern central banking (Woodford, 2005) (Rogers, 1993) . Table shows average marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) of ordered probit models for the categories 1 = never and 4 = always. Average marginal effects of the categories 2 = occasionally and 3 = often are available on request. Location-fixed effects are included but not reported. Marginal effects in bold are significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are clustered at the respondents' level (Rogers, 1993) . Table shows average marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) of ordered probit models for the categories 1 = never and 4 = always. Average marginal effects of the categories 2 = occasionally and 3 = often are available on request. Location-fixed effects are included but not reported. Marginal effects in bold are significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are clustered at the respondents' level (Rogers, 1993) . Table shows average marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) of ordered probit models for the categories 1 = never and 4 = always. Average marginal effects of the categories 2 = occasionally and 3 = often are available on request. Location-fixed effects are included but not reported. Marginal effects in bold are significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are clustered at the respondents' level (Rogers, 1993) .
